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ABSTRACT 
 
In response to global market forces such as deregulation and globalization, technological change and 
digital convergence, the telecommunications in the 1990s witnessed an enormous worldwide round of 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A). Given both M&A and Innovation a major means of today’s competitive 
strategy  development,  this  paper  examines  the  innovation  determinants  of  M&A  activity  and  the 
consequences of M&A transactions on the technological potential and the innovation performance. We 
examine  the  telecommunications  equipment  industry  over  the  period  1988-2002  using  a  newly 
constructed  data  set  with  firm-level  data  on  M&A  and  innovation  activity  as  well  as  financial 
characteristics.  By  implementing  a  counterfactual  technique  based  on  a  matching  propensity  score 
procedure,  the  analysis  not  only  controls  for  merger  endogeneity  and  ex-ante  observable  firms 
characteristics  but  also  takes  account  of  unobserved  heterogeneity.  The  study  provides  evidence  that 
M&A realize significantly positive changes to the firm’s post-merger innovation performance. The effects 
of M&A on innovation performance are in turn driven by both the success in Research and Development 
(R&D) activity and the deterioration in internal technological capabilities at acquiring firms prior to a 
merger.     
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1  Introduction 
 
The telecommunications industry is moving fast both on the technology front and in terms of 
structure.  A  recent  surge  of  Mergers  and  Acquisitions  (M&A)  in  the  telecommunications 
industry is a reflection of the drastically changing environment of the market.
1 Deregulation and 
liberalization, technological innovation and digital convergence and the evolving requirements 
of the capital markets have driven dramatic changes in the telecommunications industry as a 
whole.  The  industry  in  turn  has  sparked  fundamental  changes  in  the  economic  landscape 
worldwide.  As  the  telecommunications  firms  face  increasing  exposure  to  international 
competition,  the  industry  has  undergone  a  radical  transformation  creating  exciting  new 
opportunities and new challenges for infrastructure and service providers (Li and Whalley, 
2002). Market winners are in most cases also technology leaders or highly capable of turning a 
base technology into a superior product that meets the customer needs (Brodt and Knoll, 2004). 
The rapid technological change, growing technological complexity and the shortening 
of product life cycles add new dimensions to an already complex scenario and increasingly 
force firms to source technologies externally. Firms will often prefer M&A to other cooperative 
approaches of R&D network building, e.g., R&D joint ventures, because M&A provide an 
immediate  controlling  presence  in  the  new,  fast  expanding  market,  rather  than  having  to 
gradually build a new business or negotiate with a partner about developing a cooperation 
(Caves,  1982;  Capron  and  Mitchell,  1997).  While  several  analyses  have  stressed  that  the 
telecommunications industry has undergone major restructuring in the 1990s through intense 
M&A activity (e.g., Jamison, 1998; Kim, 2005; Rosenberg, 1998, Warf, 2003), we are not 
aware  of  any  study  which  investigates  the  linkage  between recent rises both in M&A and 
innovation  activity.  The  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  uncover  the  keen  reliance  of  the 
telecommunications firms on M&A as a technology sourcing strategy. 
We  aim  at  providing  an  answer  to  the  following  question:  Why  do  firms  in  the 
telecommunications industry increasingly use M&A as a technology source? Does M&A affect 
the innovation performance of firms involved as their proponents expect? Before attempting to 
determine this task, however, a more basic question needs to be addressed, namely: Does the 
innovation  activity  of  firms  depict  a  significant  predictor  of  entering  the  M&A  market? 
Admittedly,  technological  reasons  do  not  motivate  all  M&A.  M&A  can  be  motivated,  for 
instance,  by  the  desire  to  obtain  financial  synergies  or  market  power,  to  obtain  access  to 
distribution channels, and/or to gain entry into new markets.
2 Such M&A may not be able to be 
                                                 
1 Between 1996 and 2001, more than twenty M&A deals worth over $20 billion took place in the telecom sector, 14 
of which were in the US. Telecom mergers amount for seven of the largest operations announced in 2000, and eight 
out of the ten largest of all times (Le Blanc and Shelanski, 2002). 
2 For extensive review, see Shimizu et al. (2004)   2
directly expected to improve the firms’ innovation performance. However, in high technology 
industries where innovation is key to a competitive advantage, firms will incorporate the impact 
of M&A on technological performance even when the transaction is not innovation-driven, thus 
choosing the most appropriate innovation and financial strategies. Moreover, to the extent that 
access to technology and know-how become increasingly important to succeed in the market, 
factors such as the firm’s size, history and equity become less and less critical requirements. 
This allows new challengers to realize tremendous growth rates. Furthermore, it spurs the quest 
for  external  knowledge  sourcing  both  at  the  established  and  new  firms  in  the  market.  As 
innovation  is  becoming  indispensable  for  strategic  competitiveness  in  the  high  technology 
industry, we ask: How do firms that choose M&A and firms that stay outside of the M&A 
market differ with respect to their innovation performance? The follow up question is then, what 
are the effects of M&A on the innovative performance of firms if we control for the differences 
in innovation performance prior to M&A activities? 
Though  occurrence  of  M&A  has  grown  dramatically  in  the  last  years,  academic 
research on the relationship between innovation and M&A has not kept pace with the changes. 
In spite of the vast and rapidly growing body of literature on M&A,
3 empirical evidence which 
has explored this relationship is rather limited and often inconclusive.
4 The literature on the 
technological effects of M&A shows contradictory implications. On the one hand, M&A may 
build up competencies and foster innovation for a number of reasons. M&A can reduce high 
transaction costs related to the transmission of knowledge between firms (Bresman et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, in fast moving markets with abbreviated product life cycles, firms may perceive 
that they do not have the time to develop the required skills and knowledge internally, and 
therefore, turn outward to M&A. In this sense, M&A may offer a quick access to knowledge 
assets  (Warner  et  al.,  2006).  Moreover,  M&A  may  extend  the  technological  base  of  firms 
involved allowing them to achieve greater economies of scale and scope through more efficient 
deployment of knowledge resources. Also, M&A may enlarge the overall R&D budget of firms 
engaged, which then enables them to tackle larger R&D projects and, thereby, this spreads the 
risk of innovation. In addition, the integration of complementary knowledge may also increase 
innovation through M&A leading to more advanced technologies being developed (Gerpott, 
1995).  Finally,  by  exchanging  the  best  practices  on  innovation  management  within  the 
combined entity, firms may employ efficient technology integration. 
On the other hand, innovation-driven M&A encompass the difficulties associated with 
innovation as well as the obstacles faced in mergers. First of all, differences in corporate culture, 
processes  and  knowledge  base  may  impede  a  smooth  transition  of  knowledge  (Lane  and 
                                                 
3 For review see Roeller et al. (2001) and Shimizu et al. (2004)  
4 For review see Veugelers (2005)    3
Lubatkin, 1998; Very, 1997). Furthermore, M&A integration process is time consuming and 
costly. This may divert management attention away from innovation (Hitt et al., 1996). Also, 
trade off payment of debt and debt costs for investment in R&D can occur due to M&A (Hitt et 
al., 1990). In addition, a disadvantage of M&A is that it involves entire firms whereas the 
advantages for knowledge exchange may be limited to only a small part of the firms involved. 
In M&A, knowledge beyond that required is also acquired. This may cause indigestibility: a 
firm may acquire more knowledge than it can use in a meaningful way (Hennart and Reddy, 
1997). Finally, as the literature has shown, technologically motivated and intensive acquisitions 
are highly vulnerable to failure (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). One of the main reasons for this value 
destruction lies in the miscarried and inappropriate integration of the technology-based firm 
after the acquisition (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000). Even when the merger is successful in 
terms of the integration of R&D departments, in other business areas the merger may not be a 
success, thereby influencing a disintegration of the entire firm. 
One of the main reasons for the contradictions and inconclusiveness of previous studies 
might  be  due  to  cross-industry  investigations.  Consequently,  this  study  provides  empirical 
evidence  on  our  research  questions  by  examining  the  M&A  that  took  place  between 
telecommunications equipment firms during the 1988 to 2002 period. This period witnessed an 
enormous  wave  of  mergers  that  dramatically  reconfigured  the  market  structure  of  global 
telecommunications  equipment  as  a  result  of  international  competition  stemming  from  the 
liberalization of its market and pace of technological evolution (see figure 1 in Appendix). 
Lying  at  the  core  of  the  telecommunications  industry,  the  telecommunications  equipment 
industry takes a central role in the technological transformation of the entire industry. As the 
trade and regulatory liberalization primarily has globalized the demand for telecommunications 
equipment, technological change in the industry has had upstream effects on R&D (see figure 2 
in Appendix). Moreover, the growth in the patenting has been tremendous - from 1988 to 1998 
the number of communication equipment patents applied by the UPSTO increased by more than 
four times (see figure 3 in Appendix).
5  
The  aim  of  the  analysis  is  twofold:  first,  we  investigate  the  impact  of  success  in 
innovation activity on the likelihood that a firm engages in a merger, and second, we analyze the 
effect of a merger on a firm’s innovation performance. In order to explore the link between the 
effects of a merger and the reasons and expectations behind the transaction, we use a treatment 
effect  estimation  approach  with  endogenous  selection  using  a  matching  propensity  score 
technique. As propensity score matching estimation takes account of observable characteristics 
                                                 
5 The abrupt fall in the patent applications after 1998 in figure 3 is primarily caused by the truncation of the patent 
data sample. We have patents which were granted by 2002. Thus, we end our analysis on patents in 2000 because, in 
the subsequent years, a truncation due to the grant lag appears to be more visible. 
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of firms and to that extend its results can indicate the net effect of casual status on performance 
outcomes, we also control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
We  find  that  the  telecommunications  equipment  firms  undertake  M&A  in  order  to 
strengthen their success in innovation, and thereby, their market position. While the equipment 
manufacturers, which experienced low research productivity from ongoing exploitation of R&D 
efforts in the past, are forced to explore potential future innovation trajectories in new business 
units by acquisitions, those firms with a declining inventive portfolio are involved in pooling 
mergers to offer comprehensive and integrated equipment solutions. Finally, equipment firms in 
telecommunications  outsource  R&D  through  M&A  as  a  means  of  revitalizing  a  firm  by 
enhancing and supplementing its knowledge base effectively. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 draws a broad picture on the developments in 
telecommunications equipment industry with regard to its M&A and R&D activities. Section 3 
discusses the theoretical underpinnings of our research questions. Data description is provided 
in Section 4, while empirical methodology is presented in Section 5. We report empirical results 
and analyze their sensitivity with respect to unobserved heterogeneity in Sections 6 and 7.  
Section 8 concludes with discussion of our findings.   
 
 
2  Theoretical Background  
 
Technological change influences the ability of firms to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external competencies in order to address altering competitive and technological challenges. 
Dosi (1988) described the technological changes to be continuous or incremental because they 
reflect a path dependent and cumulative development as a technological paradigm or pattern of 
inquiry. Incremental change tends to reinforce the market power of incumbent firms because it 
utilizes existing competencies in development and can be deployed through an established set of 
sales  and  marketing  resources  (Teece,  1996).  Accumulated  prior  knowledge  and  heuristics 
constitute the learning capabilities that permits incumbents to acquire related problem-solving 
knowledge. Thereby, learning capabilities involve the development of the capacity to assimilate 
existing knowledge, while problem-solving skills represent a capacity to create new knowledge; 
and they are mutually inclusive. 
However,  to  the  extent  that  the  innovation  embodies  new  skills  or  knowledge, 
incumbents can be hindered in responding as they may have little or no relevant development 
history to draw upon (Dosi, 1988). Cohen and Levinthal (1989) elucidated the two faces of 
R&D activity. That is, R&D activity does not only stimulate innovation, but it also enhances the 
firms’ ability to assimilate outside knowledge. The second face of R&D is called the absorptive   5
capacity, and it is considered to be crucial particularly for assessing the effective contribution by 
spillovers from others. Defined as a set of knowledge and competencies, the firm's knowledge 
base remains a preliminary condition in the assimilation of spillovers from R&D efforts of 
environment.  For  Rosenberg  (1990),  fundamental  research  inside  the  firm  has  strong 
complementarities with external R&D. All in all, both Cohen & Levinthal and Rosenberg insist 
on potential synergies between the firm's own knowledge base and external flows of scientific 
and technical knowledge. In order to fulfill technological challenges, firms must absorb the 
environmental  information  on  innovation  and  eventually  be  able  to  exploit  it  through  new 
products  or  processes  in  the  market.  Thus,  the  responsiveness  of  R&D  activity  to  exploit 
external knowledge flows is an indication of the importance of absorptive capacity. In industries 
like  telecommunications,  this  response  must  be  quick  due to highly competitive conditions 
caused by short product lifecycles, new technologies, frequent entry by unexpected outsiders, 
repositioning of incumbents and radical redefinitions of market boundaries as ICT industries 
converge. Highly reactive firms with highly absorptive capacities will not wait for failure to 
spur development. By contributing R&D to the firms’ absorptive capacity, however, it should be 
noted  that  technological  performance  does  not  necessarily  depend  on  past  or  referential 
performance, but rather on absorptive capacity generated in the past. In other words, firms with 
high absorptive capacity will exploit new ideas regardless of their past performance. 
Firms, especially those with high technological content, strive to overcome constraints 
aligned with cost, appropriation, absorptive capacity and time regarding R&D performance. 
Thus, firms are faced with the associated objectives of developing a response to an innovation 
and doing so in a timely fashion. Therefore, there is a crucial strategic choice to be made for 
firms that decide to conduct R&D activities. Most theories of economic organization which rely 
on a comparison of costs or benefits per transaction to explain the organization of economic 
activity have typically ignored the possibility of multiple innovation sources. The theoretical 
literature,  drawing  on  transaction  costs  economics  (Coase,  1937;  Williamson,  1981)  and 
property rights theory (Hart and Moore, 1986), considers the choice between external sourcing 
and internal development as substitutes, i.e., the classical make-or-buy decision. Technological 
know-how is often tacit and can, therefore, not be easily transmitted from one firm to another 
(Larsson et al., 1998). In order to avoid high transaction costs, firms may be induced to engage 
in internal R&D to solve problems related to the transmission of tacit knowledge (Bresman et 
al., 1999). At the same time, internal developments may be perceived by firms because of the 
high risk due to the low probability of the innovation success and the length of required time for 
the innovations to provide adequate returns (Hundley et al., 1996). Thus, firms prefer to invest 
fewer resources in internal R&D when faced with resource constraints or attractive external 
innovation sources exist. It is argued that the acquisitions of firms with an innovative portfolio   6
of interest often represent more certainty and lower risk of exploiting knowledge assets than 
new ventures do (Chakrabarti et al., 1994). Engaging in acquisitions, firms, however, may trade 
off  payment  of  debt  and  debt  costs  for  investment  in  R&D.  That  is,  as  the  innovation 
developments embed assets that are largely non-redeployable, firms are likely to prefer the use 
of  debt  to  fund  acquisitions  rather  than to support innovation activities (Hitt et al., 1990). 
However, due to the fact that the financial and innovation strategies of future-oriented firms are 
jointly decided, a financial lack is imperative for firms pursuing a competitive strategy premised 
on innovation. Hence, the mutually exclusive choice between these innovation strategies is too 
restrictive. Moreover, R&D strategy adopted by a firm depends on its environment and on 
differences in the abilities of the firms to conduct R&D activities.  
The studies inspired by the resource- and knowledge-based approaches argue that a firm 
can  rely  on  a  combination  of  different  strategies  to  engage  in  innovation.  To  justify  the 
desideratum of the external technology source, it is essential to attend to the increasing evidence 
that a firm’s size and position within the industry affects the nature and the type of innovation in 
which  it  is  engaged  (Hart  and  Ramanantsoa,  1992;  Christensen,  1997).  On  the  one  hand, 
pursuing  to  develop  the  knowledge  and  to  create  a  new  one  internally,  firms  might  be 
particularly  blocked  from  adjusting  from  environment  by  their  prior  success  in  developing 
competencies. The former competencies may become rigidities or barriers to performance for 
radical or significant developments rather than for minor or incremental innovations since the 
latter are technological changes that are close to the current expertise. This is distinctive to 
established firms in the market or market leaders, mostly large firms, which tend to innovate in 
order to reinforce their positions or to enhance their core competencies. Having less to gain 
from a radically new design than a market challenger, they are less likely to pursue disruptive 
technologies  or  to  embrace  new  innovations  which  would  threaten  their  dominance.  The 
improvements on their R&D can be, indeed, significant, but they are not likely to change their 
status quo. Moreover, the ongoing exploitation of the existing knowledge and capabilities, even 
those that make an organization successful for a certain time, after a certain point hinders the 
creation of new knowledge and eventually leads to a technological exhaustion (March, 1991; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These self-reinforcing capacities can also create competency-
destroying technological change. Thus, a disruption in the innovation activity of firms may 
force them to turn outward to external technology source. Nevertheless, distinctive knowledge 
bases  of  internal  and  external  sources  can  be  particularly  valuable  under  conditions  of 
technological  uncertainty  (Sorenson  and  Sorensen,  2001)  and  might  be  of  use  in  creating 
knowledge complementarities. 
On  the  other  hand,  new  firms  or  market  challengers,  mostly  small  firms,  are more 
entrepreneurial and can respond more quickly to unexpected opportunities. By creating new   7
fields of technology or new skills where the market leader does not have an expertise or an 
established position, they are looking for opportunities to upset the leader’s position and to 
radically change the competitive situation, thus eliminating or diminishing the leader’ market 
dominance. While they are more likely to fail, they are more willing or able to venture into 
completely new directions because they have less of a vested interest in the current technology 
and  are  not  tied  to  sunk  investments  in  obsolete  technologies.  At  the  same  time,  small 
challengers  have  fewer  resources  to  spend  on  R&D  and  because  there  is  a  lack  of  strong 
enterprise  channels,  they  are  less  likely  to have the resources to bring an invention to the 
marketplace. This lack of manufacturing and distributing activity can be filled by large firms 
which possess a greater ability to finance a large amount of R&D as well. 
 
 
3  Data Description 
 
In order to examine the interaction between merger
6 and innovation activity, a new firm-level 
database is constructed which covers all firms in the telecommunications equipment industry 
that operated in any year over the 18 years period, 1987 to 2004 (including lagged periods). This 
database is created by complex matching process of information from initially four separate data 
sets. The first two datasets include firms’ financial characteristics and the additional two data 
sets describe the firms’ merger and innovation activities, respectively. 
We  define  the  telecommunications  equipment  firms  as  those  which  have  primary 
activity in the communications equipment Standard International Codes (SIC) 3661, 3663, or 
3669. The population of firms and their financial information including R&D expenditures were 
drawn from Compustat and Global Vantage databases. After eliminating firms with missing 
financial information, we could identify a sample of 638 telecommunications equipment firms 
for those a data on R&D expenditures, total assets, market value, cash flow, long term debt were 
available.  
Our patent statistics for the telecommunications equipment industry are based on the 
database which is compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, Hall et al., 
2001). This database comprises detailed information on all US patents granted between 1963 
and 2002 and all patent citations made between 1975 and 2002. The patent and citations data 
were procured originally from the US Patent Office and from Derwent Information Services, 
respectively. Although this US data could imply a bias in favor of US firms and against non-US 
firms, the group of non-US firms in this sample represents a group of innovative and rather 
large firms that are known to patent worldwide. Our database includes information on the patent 
                                                 
6 We employ, hereafter, the term “merger” to define both merger and acquisition if not otherwise indicated.   8
number, the application and grant dates, the detailed technology field(s) of the innovation, the 
name(s) of the inventors, the city and state from which the patent was filed and citations of prior 
patents on which the current work builds. Following the classification in Hall et al. (2001), we 
include the patents for which firms applied in twelve main classes of the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) 178, 333, 340, 342, 343, 358, 367, 370, 375, 379, 385 or 455 - in the 
category communication equipment. As the distribution of the value of patented innovations is 
extremely skewed, we also consider the number of forward citations as an indicator of the 
importance or the value of innovations for each patent, thereby overcoming the limitations of 
simple counts (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Griliches, 1990). During the observed period, 
251  firms  from  our  sample  have  applied  for  a  total  of  11,226  patents  in  communication 
equipment (including multiple applications by the same firm in the same year and for the whole 
period); this produces a total of 86,442 citations.
7  
M&A transaction data were obtained from the Thomson One Banker-Deals database. 
Updated daily, the database offers detailed information on merger transactions including target 
and acquirer profiles, deal terms, financial and legal advisor assignments, deal value and deal 
status. This database includes alliances with a deal value of more than 1 million USD, thus 
ensuring that the overwhelming majority of mergers are covered. Our initial sample on merger 
transactions contains information on 364 completed deals (including multiple deals by the same 
firm in the same year and during the observed period) carried out by 178 firms and announced 
during the period from 1988 to 2002. Using information from the data source, we distinguished 
between the role that a firm played in a M&A transaction and classified the firms in our sample 
in generally as an acquirer, the firm which purchased the stock or other equity interests of 
another entity or acquired all or a substantial portion of its assets; a target, the firm which sold a 
significant amount or all of itself to another firm; or a partner in a pooling merger, the firm 
which pooled its assets with another firm or merged with another firm of approximately equal 
size. Out of 364 M&A transactions, we could identify 217 acquirer, 25 targets and 122 partners 
in pooling mergers.
8 Furthermore, 59.6% of all of the mergers involve innovative firms, i.e., 
firms that applied for at least one patent during the observed period. While 84.8% of the merger 
firms took part up to three times in a merger, we can observe that the merger activity of the 
telecommunications equipment industry is characterized by the transactions of certain firms.
9 
For our econometric analysis, we restrict the multiple transactions carried out by one firm in the 
                                                 
7 The data set is truncated, which might cause a downward bias in the citation counts of recent patents. 
8 We lack financial data on the target firms for transactions that involve the acquisitions mostly of a privately held 
and/or a relatively small firms that are not operated in the US and not listed in Global Vantage. 
9 For instance, the large-scale firms such as Ericsson, Siemens, ADC Telecommunications, Motorola and Alcatel 
carried out 17.86% of the total merger transactions.   9
same year to the largest transaction only.
10 Finally, the estimation sample consists of total 300 
M&A transactions, which involve 186 acquirer, 22 targets and 94 partners in pooling mergers. 
The databases were matched on the basis of firm names, CUSIP numbers
11 and address 
information  provided  by  each  database.  The  firms  that  are  lacking  information  or  have 
inadequate data on the matching procedure were cross-checked and completed with information 
reported in the Dun & Bradstreet’s “Who owns whom” annual issues. 
 
 
4  Econometric Methodology 
 
4.1  Estimating the Propensity to Merge 
We  start  our  analysis  by  exploring  the  determinants  of  mergers  and  by  investigating  the 
attractiveness  of  telecommunications  equipment  firms  as  merger  candidates.  Employing  a 
random utility model, we consider the firm i’s decision of whether to acquire, to be acquired, to 
have  involvement  in  a  pooling  merger  or  to  stay  outside  the  merger  market.  The  utilities 
associated with each of these choices k  are modeled as a function of the firm’s characteristics 
i X  which affect the utilities differently: 
 
= + ik i k ik U X e β                                                                                                                          (1)                                                                                              
 
While the level of utility is not observable, we can, however, infer from the firms’ choices how 
they rank each of these alternatives. If we assume that the  ij e  are distributed Weibull, the 
differences in the disturbances are distributed logistic and a multinomial logit can be used to 
estimate the differences in the parameters β. 
The  propensity  of  engaging  in  a  merger  is  modeled  as  a  function  of  the  firm’s 
characteristics. We base the analysis on a panel that consists of innovation-related and financial 
variables on both merged and non-merged firms for which data were available during the 1988 
to 2002 period. The probability that firm i chooses alternative k  is specified 
 
( )
( ) ( )
= =
  −   ∑ ∑
'
k i
m m ' '
l i l k i l l
exp X 1
Pr(i chooses k )
exp X exp X
β
β β β
                                            (2)                                                                       
                                                 
10 The frequency of merger transactions carried out by one firm in the same year is as follows: 294 firms with one 
deal, 44 firms with two deals, six firms with three deals, and three firms with four deals in a given year during the 
sample period.  
11 CUSIP stands for Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures.  
   10
 
where  1 m ,..., β β are m vectors of unknown regression parameters. 
An important property of the multinomial logit model is that relative probabilities are 
independent from each other, which is the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property. In order to obtain robust standard errors of estimated coefficients, appropriate 
tests were conducted, which are discussed in Section 5.1. 
In the following, we explain the determinants of a merger captured by our analysis and 
assess  the  appropriateness  and  plausibility  of  the  merger choice. Summary statistics of the 
variables are shown in table 1.
12  
The innovation performance of a firm is examined with respect to its R&D input, R&D 
output, the stock of accumulated knowledge generated by past R&D efforts, and the research 
productivity. R&D input and R&D output of firms are measured by their R&D expenditure
13 
and  the  number  of  patent  applications  that  are  actually  granted,  respectively.  As  a  strong 
relationship exists between the size of the firm and its R&D expenditure and total number of 
patents,  as  suggested  by  common  innovation  studies,  we  took  the  ratios  of  the  R&D 
expenditures and the patent counts to the total assets; we then defined them as R&D intensity 
and patent intensity, respectively. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In  order  to  account  not  only  for  the  quantity  but  also  the  quality  of  the  patented 
inventions, we measured the patent-based characteristics of a firm using the number of forward 
citations of patents. The number of citations received by any given patent is truncated in time 
because we only know about the citations received thus far. In other words, the number of 
forward  citations  a  patent  received  depends  on  the  year  of  the  application.  We,  therefore, 
normalize the citation counts by their average value calculated over all patents belonging to the 
same technological sub-class whose application was filed in the same year.
14 We then weight 
each  patent  of  a  firm  by  the  number  of  normalized  citations  that  it  subsequently  received 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). 
The stock of accumulated knowledge of a firm is measured using citation-based patents 
and calculated by applying the perpetual inventory method by assuming a depreciation rate of 
15%  per  annum  (Hall,  1990).  Hence,  the  individual  patents  in  the  firm’s  knowledge  base 
                                                 
12 We checked that there exists no multicollinearity among selected variables. 
13 R&D expenditures involve both current and capital expenditures, where the current expenditures are composed of 
labor costs and other current costs, and the capital expenditures are the annual gross expenditures on fixed assets used 
in the R&D projects of firms. 
14 This is the fixed-effects approach proposed in Hall et al. (2001)   11
provide the basis for comparing the firm’s own knowledge base with that of other firms. R&D 
productivity, defined as the ratio of citation-weighted patent to R&D expenditure, accounts for 
the firm’s research productivity. Research productivity may be interpreted as the efficiency with 
which R&D brings forth new and useful knowledge. 
Since financial profiles of firms are likely to influence both their innovative and merger 
activity, we also include the firms’ financial characteristics. To express all monetary values in 
real terms, we employ the U.S. industry-based Producer Price Index with basis year 1999. All 
covariates  in  the  regressions  have  been  lagged  by  one  year  in  order  to  avoid  potential 
endogeneity  problems  as  well  as  possible  biases  arising  from  different  merger  accounting 
methods and financial statement consolidation. 
Firm size is proxied by the book value of the total assets. Some empirical evidence has 
shown that the purchase of larger companies is positively related to post-merger performance, as 
larger targets can benefit the buyer in terms of economies of scale, a larger resource base and a 
larger customer base (Seth, 1990; Loderer and Martin, 1992; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001). However, other studies have claimed that these potential benefits might not be 
realized if the integration of larger acquired organizations creates greater coordination problems 
and needs resources to be devoted to solve this at the expense of business operations, thus 
leading to a negative impact of a merger (Lubatkin 1983; Kusewitt 1985; Ahuja and Katila, 
2001). 
The economic performance of a firm is proxied by firm growth and Tobin’s q. Firm 
growth is measured by the annual growth rate of the market value. Firms with growing market 
value  may  appear  as  likely  acquisition  targets  for  mature  firms  looking  to  absorb  growth 
opportunities. We approximate Tobin’s q by calculating the ratio of the market value to the 
book value of a firm’s assets, where the former is the sum of the book value of long-term debt 
and the market value of common equity (Danzon et al., 2004). According to the q-theory of 
investment,  capital  should  flow  from  low-q  to  high-q  firms.  Indeed,  by  knowledge  flows, 
technology shocks cause a large variation in the firms’ Tobin’s q (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2004).  The  interpretation  of  the  effect  of  Tobin’s  q  should  be  treated  with  some  caution, 
because, apart from being a forward looking indicator - a firm’s growth opportunities (Gugler et 
al.,  2004),  Tobin’s  q  is  also  likely  to  reflect  stock  undervaluation  (Mork  et  al.,  1990),  or 
managerial performance (Powell, 1997). 
The  cash  flow  ratio  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  cash  flow  to  the  total  assets,  and  it 
represents  the  financial  capabilities  of  the  firms.  The  cash-flow  ratio  amounts  for  funds 
available to a firm for operations, investments and acquisitions. Given the argument that R&D is 
primarily financed by internally generated resources, the cash-flow ratio might be an important   12
determinant  of  the  (inclusively)  choice  between  internal  R&D  or  external  know-how  of 
innovative firms. 
We include a dummy variable which indicates missing R&D values and equals one 
when R&D is missing and zero otherwise (Hall, 1999). For the firm-years observations with 
missing R&D intensity, we then set the R&D intensity equal to zero. Moreover, to capture the 
difference between firms with no R&D output, we employ similarly a dummy for firms with 
zero (citation-weighted) patent intensity. 
Table 2 depicts the t-statistics of the differences in means of the firms’ characteristics 
separately for merged and non-merged firms. Firms that actually merged are characterized by a 
greater knowledge stock expressed in accumulated intellectual property rights than firms that 
did not merge. In terms of total assets, there is a significant size difference between merged and 
non-merged firms, thus showing that larger firms are more likely to merge.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The merged firms had, on average, a larger Tobin’s q and cash-flow ratio, and they were less 
likely to have missing R&D values and zero (citation-weighted) patent intensity. The firms in 
our sample do not differ significantly in their R&D and (citation-weighted) patent intensity as 
well as research productivity prior to a merger. 
 
4.1   Estimating the Impact of M&A on Innovation 
Our analysis of the effects of mergers controls for endogeneity and ex-ante observable firm 
characteristics using a propensity score method (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
For each firm i in the sample, let  i M  be a merger indicator that equals one when the 
firm engages in a merger and zero otherwise. We denote  1 i Y  as the innovation performance of 
merging and  0 i Y  as the innovation performance of non-merging firms and observe  i M  and 
hence  ( ) 1 0 1 i i i i i Y M Y M Y = ⋅ + − ⋅ . Accordingly, let  1 1   =   i i E Y M and  0 0   =   i i E Y M  denote 
average  outcomes  of  the  technological  performances  of  merged  and  non-merged  firms, 
respectively. The effect we are interested in is that of merger on the technological performance 
of the merged firms, or the difference between the expected innovative performances of the 
merged firms and the firms that would have experienced if they did not merge:  
 
=     = = − =     i M 1 i1 i i0 i E Y M 1 E Y M 1 τ                                                                                 (3)                                                                                                                                
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This  denotes  the  expected  treatment  effect  on  the  treated.  Since  we  do  not  have  the 
counterfactual evidence of what would have happened if a firm had not engaged in a merger, 
0 1   =   i i E Y M is unobservable. However, it can be estimated by  0 0   =   i i E Y M and the effect 
can be then given by the difference in the average outcome between the merged and non-
merged innovative performances:  
 
      = = − =    
e
i1 i i0 i E Y M 1 E Y M 0 τ                                                                                      (4)                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
In fact, we have observations on the firms which did not engage in a merger, but if the merged 
and the non-merged firms systematically differ in their firm characteristics, (4) will be a biased 
estimator of (3) (Hirano et al., 2002).
15  
Rubin  (1997),  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983,  1984)  showed  that  a  propensity  score 
analysis of observational data can be used to create groups of treated and control units that have 
similar characteristics, whereby comparisons can be made within these matched groups. In these 
groups, there are firms that have been merged and firms that have not been merged; hence, the 
allocation of the merger can be considered to be random inside the groups of firms. 
The merger propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of engaging in a merger 
given a set of observed covariates  i X : 
 
( ) ( ) Pr 1   = = =   i i i i i p M M X E M X                                                                                     (5) 
 
The treatment effect of a merger is then estimated as the expectation of the conditional effects 
over the distribution of the propensity score in the merged sample: 
 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) , , =     = = − = =     i i M 1 p M i1 i i i0 i i i E E Y p M M 1 E Y p M M 0 M 1 τ
                         (6)                                
 
The propensity score matching relies on two key assumptions (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; 1984). The first, conditional independence assumption (CIA) requires that conditional on 
the propensity score potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. The CIA 
assumes that selection into treatment occurs only on observable characteristics. Hence, unbiased 
treatment effect estimates are obtained when we have controlled for all relevant covariates. The 
second assumption is the common support or overlap condition, meaning that firms must have a 
positive  probability  of  being  either  merger  and  non-merger  rather  than  just  having  same 
                                                 
15 Descriptive data in Table 2 show that merged and non-merged firms in our sample suggest significant differences 
in the observed characteristics.   14
covariate  values.  In  sum,  the  propensity  score  matching  relies  on  the  “strong  ignorability” 
assumption, which implies that for common values of covariates, the choice of treatment is not 
based on the benefits of alternative treatments. 
Using the stratification matching, we estimate the effects of a merger on innovation 
performance by taking the weighted average (by number of merged firms) of the within-strata 
average differences in performance outcomes between merged and non-merged firms. This is 
the average treatment effect on the treated referred to in the causal inference literature.  
 
 
5  Empirical Results 
 
5.1  Technological Determinants of a Merger 
In this section, we examine the merger decision of the telecommunications equipment firms in a 
multivariate  analysis.  Given  that  both  merging  and  non-merging  firms  are  included  in  the 
sample,  we  can  attempt  to  distinguish  between  the  characteristics  of  merging  firms  in 
transaction events and the firms outside of the merger market. We estimate equation (2) using a 
multinomial logit model with four outcomes: to be an acquirer, to be acquired, to be a pooling 
merger, or to be not involved in a merger. There are substantial drawbacks associated with the 
use of the multinomial logit estimation because it assumes that the disturbances are independent 
across alternatives. This assumption suggests that if a firm was choosing between the four 
alternatives, then there is no relationship between a firm's disturbances for being an acquirer, a 
target, a partner in a pooling merger or does not involvement in a merger. In the context of this 
analysis,  it  is  likely  that  merger  behavior  will  not  fulfill  this  requirement.  The  test  of  the 
maintained assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) will indicate whether the 
ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is entirely unaffected by the systematic 
utilities of any other alternatives. In order to examine how the estimation results are affected by 
this  property,  four  Hausman  tests  were  conducted.  The  results  from  multinomial  logit  are 
compared with those from a binomial logits between the non-merged firms sample and each of 
the samples of acquiring, acquired and pooling merged firms as well as between acquirer and 
pooling merger samples. The p-values associated with the resulting test statistics were .88, .93, 
.76, and .67, respectively. Therefore, the null hypotheses are not rejected each, which implies 
that the IIA assumption does not adversely affect the estimates. Furthermore, the results of the 
binomial logit regressions were almost identical to those of multinomial logit model. This also 
substantiates that the independence assumption is not a concern of our analysis, and we can 
utilize robust estimates of the variance of the estimated coefficients.   15
Table 3 presents the marginal effects for the multinomial logit regressions. The statistics 
for the joint hypothesis and likelihood ratio tests are also reported. All estimated models are 
highly significant as indicated by the likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the slope 
coefficients are jointly zero, which are rejected at the 1 percent level using the chi-square test 
statistic. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Merging firms as a whole seem to have, on average, a significantly different innovative 
profile compared to that of non-merging firms. Larger firms, as measured by the book value of 
total assets, are more likely to engage in merger activity. This suggests that large firms are more 
willing to make use of their large and more stable internal funds to finance external R&D 
projects. A 100 percent increase in a firm’s total assets is associated with a .0026 and .0005 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of acquiring another firm and being involved in a 
pooling merger, respectively, which is a .37 and a 1.67 percent increase in each probability. 
The significantly positive effect of the cash flow ratio on the likelihood to acquire 
another firm suggests that acquiring firms have considerable cash to run a larger firm and 
agency  controls are imperfect. This is in accordance with the evidence that possessing the 
ability to finance a merger tends to precipitate acquisitions. Firms with a relatively low cash 
flow  ratio  tend  not  to  engage  in  a  merger  due  to  their  financial  constraints.  Thus,  either 
imperfect  agency  concerns  or  availability  of  financing  are  significant  constraints  on 
acquisitions. 
In the current sample, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between 
the variables confirming the growth opportunities of firms, which are growth in market value 
and Tobin’s q, and the probability that a firm is engaged in a merger.  
When we take the proposed determinants on innovative performance of the firms into 
account, then, at first, the merging firms are more likely to have a large accumulated citation-
based patent stock. This evidence seems to be in accordance with the theoretical argument that a 
large stock of accumulated knowledge is essential if the acquirer (or one partner in a pooling 
merger)  is  to  have  the  necessary  absorptive  capacity  to  identify  the  appropriate  target  (or 
another  partner  in  a  pooling  merger).  The  fact  that  firms  with  a  rather  low  accumulated 
knowledge stock are less likely to engage in a merger supports this evidence. 
Next,  firms  with  greater  R&D  and  citation-based  patent  intensities  have  a  greater 
propensity to undertake acquisitions. These results seem to mutually support the hypothesis that 
higher levels of relative absorptive capacity and the strengthening of its creation on the part of 
research-focused firms are necessary for those firms to incorporate and exploit new research   16
into their R&D programs effectively. We also obtain a significantly negative coefficient of the 
dummy for acquiring firms when R&D expenditure is not reported, which are expected to have 
zero or low R&D intensity. Therefore, the acquirer are more likely to have non zero R&D input 
in the year before the merger. At the same time, the non-merging firms tend to have more 
frequent zero R&D intensity than merging firms. 
After  controlling  for  R&D  and  citation-based  patent  intensities,  we  find  that  the 
likelihood  of  becoming  an  acquirer  is  higher  with  the  lower  R&D  productivity  of  firms. 
Although the acquiring firms experienced higher input and output in R&D, they seem to carry 
either a low number of patents and/or a relatively low-valued patents yield of R&D dollars 
before acquisitions. As mentioned above, large firms are often argued to have a lower R&D 
productivity than that of their somewhat smaller rivals because research conducted in most large 
laboratories is found to generate predominantly minor improvement inventions rather than new 
major inventions. This result suggests that an enhanced desire to acquire new technology and 
innovation-related assets driven by declining returns from the exploitation of the firms’ existing 
knowledge base exists. At this step of the analysis, we are yet cautious about this indication, 
since the target probability regression provides insignificant results on marginal effects. The 
lack of preciseness in the target estimation may due to the fact that the probability of being 
acquired greatly varies among the small sample of target firms. We will come back to this point 
as some predications regarding the target firms’ pre-merger performance can be derived from 
the next step of our analysis. 
An interesting result is that firms with a poor accumulated citation-weighted patent 
stock and, at the same time, presenting higher R&D productivity tend to not engage in a merger. 
We  ascribe  these  firms  to  be  relatively  young  and  with  significantly  new  know-how.  The 
negative effect of firm size on the propensity to stay outside of the merger activity also seems to 
point toward that direction. Moreover, the coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model, 
which are not reported here, indicate that acquisition targets possessed a significantly large 
accumulated knowledge stock than the non-merged firms. 
Finally, firms that experienced a low R&D output are more likely to be involved in a 
pooling, suggesting that the lack of innovation is an important driving force behind the merger 
activity. There is no significant relationship between R&D productivity and the propensity to go 
through a pooling merger that would further confirm this evidence. 
 
5.2  Post-Merger Innovation Performance 
Implementing  the  matching  requires  choosing  a  set  of  variables  that  satisfy  the 
plausibility  of  the  CIA.  This  implies  that  only  variables  that  simultaneously  influence  the 
merger decision and the outcome variable(s) should be included. The outcomes of the firms’   17
innovation performance are defined as the annual growth rates of the innovation determinants, 
e.g., we analyze the post-merger annual percentage changes of innovation input and output, 
knowledge stock and research productivity. In order to derive the merger propensity score, we 
estimated the multinomial logit model of equation (2) with annual percentage changes of the 
innovation and financials covariates used in our first step of analysis as well as their interaction 
terms. 
In order to check the common support region, we compare the maximum and minimum 
propensity scores in the merged and non-merged groups. That is, we discard all observations 
whose propensity score is smaller than minimum and larger than maximum in the opposite 
group. As a consequence, any observations lying outside the region of common support given 
by [0.0072,0.6101] are excluded. Almost 42.6 percent of non-merged firms have a propensity 
score below 0.1, while 7.3 percent of merged firms have the same low propensity scores.
16 Since 
the number of treated firms lost due to common support requirement amounts up to 3 percent of 
the treated group and there are still comparable control firms to remaining treated firms, a good 
overlap in the estimated propensities scores for merged and non-merged firms in the sample is 
verified.  
The data in the region of propensity score overlap were subclassified into five blocks 
defined by the quintiles of the propensity scores for merged firms.
 17 To check for the adequacy 
of  the  propensity  score  model,  we  then  used  a  two-way  ANOVA  to  assess  whether  the 
propensity score balances each covariate between the merged and non-merged groups of firms. 
Each covariate is regressed on the merger and the propensity score stratum indicator and their 
interaction  as  factors.  The  insignificant  effects  of  mergers  and  insignificant  effects  of  the 
interaction  between  propensity  score  stratum  and  merger  indicators  determine  that  the 
distributions of the covariates within the sub-classes are the same for merged and non-merged 
firms.
18 The results of T-tests of the differences in outcome means in both groups after the 
stratification matching are shown in Table 4. The balance in covariates of merged and non-
merged  firms  assures  an  unbiased  estimate  of  the  effect  of  a  merger  on  the  innovation 
performance (Dehejia and Wahba, 1990). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since the full impact of mergers on the innovation performance takes time and results 
may not be evident immediately., we examine the impact of a merger in year t on the change in 
                                                 
16 Rosenbaum (1984) argues that low propensity score below than 0.1 percent is not uncommon in distributions of 
propensity score estimates, even for treatment observations. 
17 Five sub-classes (quintiles) constructed from the propensity scores will often suffice to remove over 90% of the 
selection bias due to each of the covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). 
18 Before subclassification, we found using one-way ANOVA significant effects of mergers on more covariates.   18
outcomes from   to  + + t 1 t 2 ,   to  + + t 2 t 3and   to  + + t 3 t 4 , in order to capture the long-run 
post-merger performance .
19  
Table 5 reports our findings on the effects of mergers on innovation performance. The 
impact of mergers appears to be more concentrated in the first year following a merger. Herein, 
stronger  results  are  obtained  for  our  main  variables  which  more strictly explain the firm’s 
innovation performance. 
First, the annual percentage change of R&D intensity displays a significantly positive 
sign in all three years following a merger. Hence, according to our previous result from the first 
stage of the analysis, this indicates that the strong R&D intensity of acquiring firms positively 
influences the assimilation of the external knowledge by supplementing in-house R&D effort. 
Moreover, it suggests that the firms engaged in the mergers did not depreciate their investments 
in R&D on behalf of financing the transaction.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, we find that mergers are followed by an improvement in the accumulated citation-
based patent stock. In addition to the partners in a pooling merger, who possessed a large 
accumulated knowledge stock prior a merger, the targets also tend to be firms with highly 
valued  patent  stock.  This  result  is  in  accordance  with  our  prediction  that  accumulated 
knowledge stock confers an ability to recognize the new knowledge in environment and this 
ability seem to enhance the technological strengths even further. 
The merged firms experience a significantly positive impact on the (citation-based) 
patent intensity compared to those outcomes that these firms would have reached if they had not 
been merged. Due to the fact that the acquiring firms had a higher citation-based patent intensity 
prior acquisitions, this effect suggests that an intensification of high-valued patents creation 
relative to the firm’s assets base prior an acquisition generates a significantly high innovation 
output of the merged entity. Additionally, the pooling partners which faced some absence of 
innovation  efficiency  in  terms  of  the  innovation  output  seem  to  grow  following  a  merger, 
potentially  because  the  merger  provided  access  to  technological  resources  which  the  firms 
previously lacked. 
Furthermore, the insignificant result on the post-merger research productivity suggests 
that the marginal returns from R&D investments do not change with respect to the innovation 
output. At the same time, merged and non-merged firms do not significantly differ in their 
                                                 
19 We cannot compare pre- and post-merger performance of merged firms with the matched sample of non-merging 
firms over the same time period because we lack pre-merger accounting data for one component of the merged entity 
for a significant fraction of our mergers.   19
financial characteristics such as cash flow ratio and Tobin’s q, at least for the observation 
period. 
Finally, we find a significant increase in the following variables reflecting the firms’ 
economic performance. Firstly, there is a firm’s size growth effect with respect to the annual 
percentage changes in the total assets as typically expected. Secondly, the positively significant 
increase in the annual growth of the market value on average confirms that, in the first year 
following the mergers, overall returns for shareholders are above those of the non-merged firms 
with similar characteristics.  
 
6  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
CIA assumes that the effects of casual merger are not influenced by any correlation between 
unobserved  factors  and  a  firm’s  selection  into  casual  merger.  Hence,  the  treatment  effect 
estimators are not robust against “hidden bias” if unobserved factors like managerial skills and 
technological shocks that affect the merger are also correlated with the outcomes. After the 
adjusting for selection bias due to non-overlapping support and discrepancies in the distribution 
between  merged  and  non-merged  firms,  the  purpose  of  sensitivity  analysis  is  to  determine 
whether or not inference about treatment effects may be altered by unobservable variables in 
order to undermine our conclusions of matching analysis. While it is not possible to estimate the 
magnitude of selection bias with non-experimental data, the bounding approach proposed by 
Rosenbaum (2002) does provide a way of judging how strongly an unmeasured confounding 
variable must affect the selection process.  
If we let ui be an unmeasured covariate that affects the probability pi of a firm i of 
selecting into the treatment and xi are the observed covariates that determine treatment and 
outcome variable, then treatment assignment can be described as  
 
( )
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where  i 0 u 1 ≤ ≤ . 
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that this relationship implies the following bounds on the odds ratio 
between treated i and control j units which are matched on the propensity score P(x) 
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where  ( ) ( ) i j exp u u Γ γ = − . 
Because of the bounds on u, a given value of γ  measures the degree of which the difference 
between selection probabilities can be a result of hidden bias.  1 γ = and thus  1 Γ = imply that 
both matched firms have the same probability of the engaging in a merger and thus no hidden 
bias exist. Increasing values of  Γ imply an increasingly influence of unobservables, if they 
exist, on the selection decision. In other words, if a large value of Γ does alter inferences about 
the merger effect, the study is sensitive to selection bias.  
We  adopt  Becker  and  Galiendo’s  (2007)  procedure  for  bounding  treatment  effect 
estimates for binary outcomes and define an new outcome variables which take the binary 
values according to the annual growth of performance outcomes.
20 Table 6 contains the results 
of the sensitivity analysis for the significant effects of the mergers on the annual growth of the 
firms’ innovation input and output, and knowledge stock in the first year following a merger.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
We show the Mantel and Haenszel (MH,1959) test statistics for the averaged treatment 
effect on the treated while setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value Γ . The MH test 
statistics is used to test the null hypothesis of no merger effect and at each  Γ  we calculate a 
hypothetical significance level “p-critical”, which represents the bound on the significance level 
of  the  treatment  effect  in  the  case  of  endogenous  self-selection  into  treatment.  Given  the 
positive estimated treatment effects and thus looking at the bounds under the assumption that we 
have  overestimated  the  true  treatment  effects,  reveals that robustness to hidden bias varies 
across the outcome variables.
21 Under the assumption of no hidden bias (e 1
γ = ), the MH test 
statistics  provide  a  similar  results  suggesting  significant  merger  effects.  The  finding  of  a 
positive effect of mergers on the patent intensity is at least robust to the possible presence of 
selection bias. The critical value of  e
γ  is 1.20 indicating that firms with the same observable 
characteristics differ in their odds of treatment by 20 percent. Next, the critical value of  e
γ at 
which we would have to question our conclusion of a positive effect on the R&D intensity is 
between 1.40 and 1.60. However, the Rosenbaum bounds are worst-case scenarios. Hence, a 
critical value of 1.40 does not mean that unobserved heterogeneity exist and there is no merger 
effect on the innovation input. This result means that the confidence interval for the R&D 
                                                 
20 Stata module mhbounds (Becker and Galiendo, 2007) is applied for the case of binary outcome variables. We 
define an outcome variable taking the value 1 if a firm had a positive annual growth an 0 otherwise. 
21 The significance levels p
+ calculated under assumption of overestimation treatment effect are presented.   21
intensity effect would include zero if the odds ratio of treatment assignment differs between the 
merged and non-merged firms by 1.40 due to an unobserved variable. Furthermore, the effect on 
the  knowledge  stock  remains  significantly  positive  even  in  the  presence  of  substantial 
unobserved bias by a factor of 2. This result imply that if an unobserved variable caused the 
odds ratio of merging to differ between the merged and non-merged firms by a factor of as 
much  as  2,  the  90  percent  confidence  interval  would  still  exclude  zero.  Thus  the  positive 
estimated  effects  on  the  firms’  innovation  input  and  knowledge  stock  are  robust  to  the 
unobserved heterogeneity, while the positive effect on the patenting intensity is less so. 
 
 
7  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper delivers insights into the desirability of M&A for the innovation performance of 
firms  by  analyzing  the  mergers  that  took  place  in  the  international  telecommunications 
equipment industry from the late 1980s until the early 2000s. We provide evidence on strictly 
complementary as well as mutually supportive results. The overwhelming conclusion that arises 
from  the  analysis  is  that,  on  average,  mergers  realize  significantly  positive  changes  to  the 
innovation  performance  of  firms  following  a  merger.  The  post-merger  changes  are  in  turn 
driven  by  both  the  success  in  R&D  activity  and  the  weakness  in  internal  technological 
capabilities at acquiring firms prior to a merger. 
The  findings  about  the  innovation-related  characteristics  of  the  merging  firms have 
interesting  implications  for  the  propositions  about  the  rationale  of  mergers  set  out  in  our 
theoretical section. According to the absorptive capacity theory (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
Chesbrough,  2003),  firms  with  a  greater  R&D  intensity  and  a  larger stock of accumulated 
knowledge have a greater propensity to engage in the technological-related mergers, and these 
underlying  higher  levels  of  absorptive  capacity  convincingly  indicate  the  necessity  for  the 
identification, the assimilation and the exploitation of the targets’ technological knowledge. The 
analysis provides strong evidence, according to which firms with rapid R&D and firms that 
extensively apply the results of scientific advances to their own R&D results, e.g., inventions, 
acquire  better  quality patents. Moreover, unobserved factors which select firms into casual 
mergers do not appear to be correlated with unobserved factors which influence their innovation 
input and knowledge stock. 
We find support for the view that firms experiencing a decline in internal research 
productivity or which are more inefficient in inventive output are more likely to engage in an 
acquisition or a pooling merger, respectively, as an effort to boost their research pipelines. In 
effect, firms which face greater distress in the effectiveness of patenting activity appear to grow   22
their invention intensity following a merger, which is probably because the merger provided a 
rectified access to the appropriate technological resources. However, increased patenting may 
not be directly resulting from higher R&D intensity and accordingly not related to protecting 
investment in R&D (Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Hall, 2001). Particularly, the increased (citation-
weighted) patent intensity following a merger could stem from technological and managerial 
improvements. That is, the merged firms had redirected more of their R&D investments toward 
applied rather than basic research and/or improved their innovation management. Since the 
mergers have, on average, an insignificant effect on the research productivity of the merged 
firms, this interpretation is quite tentative. Nevertheless, an increase in the inventive output 
intensity  of  the  merged  firms  following  a  merger  is  suggestive  of  improvements  to  the 
underlying research portfolio as this is a direct measure of a firm’s innovation performance. 
After controlling for hidden bias, we do, however, find a week evidence that merged firms are 
more intensive than their counterfactual non-merged firms in the patenting activity on average. 
Furthermore, we find that larger firms with strong internal funds to finance R&D are 
more likely to acquire and to engage in a pooling merger, whereas the firms which lack these 
characteristics are more likely to pursue technology internally. Solely relying on in-house R&D, 
non-merged  firms  are  appear  to  be  rather  young  and  small  market  challengers,  which  are 
striving to rival the market establisher with a significantly new and/or advanced technology on 
their own. Contrary to these firms, the acquired firms seem to be experienced entrepreneurs that 
have succeeded in the past at generating larger and high-valued inventions.  
The  analysis  reveals  that  mergers  are,  on  average,  a  positive  experience  for 
shareholders, at least for a short-time span. Moreover, the finding that, in the long-run, mergers 
did not cut R&D spending suggests that post-merger R&D effort is not affected by financial 
resource constraints induced by the transaction and integration processes. 
With respect to the average effects of mergers, the analysis has clearly shown that the 
merged firms faced different outcomes regarding the post-merger innovation performance. One 
potential explanation of the variability in the performances might be due to different financing 
of the mergers transactions. The decision on merger financing has important implications for 
merger  capital  structure,  future  profitability,  subsequent  financing  choices  and  ownership 
structure. Therefore, it might have a significant impact on the R&D performance of a merger 
too. How and to what extend the merger financing choice affects firms’ post-merger innovation 
deserves further investigations in future research.   23
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Table 1. Sample Statistics (n = 9,570 firm-years) 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
R&D Intensity 
 
0.115  0.336 
Patent Intensity 
 
0.019  0.097 
Patent Stock (Ln) 
 
1.441  1.504 
R&D Productivity 
 
0.237  1.194 
Total Assets (Ln) 
 
4.001  2.120 
Annual Growth of Market Value (Ln) 
 
1.519  3.236 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.091  3.259 
Cash-Flow Ratio 
 
-0.162  1.460 
Indicator for Missing R&D Expenses 
 
0.171  0.376 
Indicator for Zero Patent Intensity 
 
0.512  0.500 
 
Notes:  The figures refer to the sample used for the estimation of the multinomial logit model (Table 3). 
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Table 2. Merged versus Non-Merged Firms before Matching 
 
 
 
Mean 
(Standard Error) 
 
 
 
Merged Firms 
 
Non-Merged Firms 
 
t-statistic for 
difference in 
means 
R&D Intensity 
 
 
0.105 
(0.005) 
 
0.115 
(0.005) 
 
0.48 
Patent Intensity 
 
0.014 
(0.003) 
 
            0.020 
(0.001) 
 
  0.85 
Patent Stock (Ln) 
 
2.327 
(0.152) 
 
1.378 
(0.029) 
 
      -8.00
*** 
R&D Productivity 
 
0.214 
(0.067) 
 
0.238 
(0.024) 
 
  0.27 
Total Assets (Ln) 
 
5.344 
(0.153) 
 
3.914 
(0.031) 
 
    -10.89
*** 
Annual Growth of Market Value (Ln) 
 
1.410 
(0.081) 
 
1.611 
           (0.06) 
 
             0.52 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.476 
(0.158) 
 
2.037 
(0.057) 
 
    -2.01
** 
Cash-Flow Ratio 
 
0.019 
(0.016) 
 
-0.174 
(0.023) 
 
    -2.10
** 
Indicator for Missing R&D Expenses 
 
            0.100 
(0.018) 
 
0.175 
(0.005) 
 
      3.20
*** 
Indicator for Zero Patent Intensity 
 
0.455 
(0.030) 
 
0.515 
(0.007) 
 
   1.90
* 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* difference in sample means is significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level, respectively.   29
Table 3. Marginal Effects of the Propensity of Involvement in M&A Activity 
   
 
  Acquirer  Target  Pooling Merger 
 
No M&A 
 
 
R&D Intensity 
 
    0.34e-02
*** 
(0.11e-02) 
 
      -0.62e-05 
(0.34e-04) 
 
      -0.20e-02 
(0.13e-02) 
 
      -0.13e-02 
(0.17e-02) 
 
Patent Intensity 
 
     0.76e-05
*** 
(0.28e-05) 
 
      -0.45e-07 
(0.17e-06) 
 
 -0.39e-05
** 
(0.21e-05) 
 
      -0.37e-05 
      (0.35e-05) 
 
Patent Stock (Ln) 
 
   0.34e-05
** 
(0.16e-05) 
 
       0.20e-07 
(0.72e-07) 
 
    0.35e-05
*** 
(0.11e-05) 
 
  -0.70e-05
*** 
(0.20e-05) 
 
R&D Productivity 
 
   -0.79e-05
*** 
(0.27e-05) 
 
       0.67e-07 
(0.23e-06) 
 
0.15e-05 
 (0.19e-05) 
 
0.62e-05* 
(0.34e-05) 
 
Total Assets (Ln) 
 
    0.26e-02
*** 
(0.41e-03) 
 
      -0.54e-05 
(0.15e-04) 
 
   0.48e-03
** 
(0.19e-03) 
 
  -0.31e-02
*** 
(0.45e-03) 
 
Annual Growth of Market Value 
(Ln) 
 
      -0.78e-06 
(0.17e-05) 
 
      -0.64e-08 
(0.28e-07) 
 
0.88e-06 
(0.10e-05) 
 
      -0.89e-07 
(0.20e-05) 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
       0.36e-05 
(0.25e-05) 
 
0.15e-06 
(0.58e-06) 
 
0.82e-06 
(0.14e-05) 
 
      -0.46e-05 
(0.30e-05) 
 
Cash-Flow Ratio 
 
    0.17e-04
*** 
(0.76e-05) 
 
 
0.53e-05 
(0.14e-04) 
 
0.34e-05 
(0.27e-05) 
 
-0.26e-04
* 
(0.16e-04) 
Indicator for Missing R&D 
expenses 
   -0.44e-02
*** 
(0.17e-02) 
0.16e-04 
(0.59e-04) 
0.37e-03 
(0.11e-02) 
  0.40e-02
** 
(0.21e-02) 
 
Indicator for Zero Patent 
Intensity 
 
      -0.17e-02 
(0.14e-02) 
 
      -0.10e-04 
(0.36e-04) 
 
0.12e-02 
(0.84e-03) 
 
0.51e-03 
(0.17e-02) 
 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
(Percentage Points) 
 
0.70 
 
0.00 
 
0.30 
 
99.00 
 
Observations 
 
217 
 
25 
 
122 
 
9,206 
 
 
Log Likelihood 
 
    -1,350.60 
 
Restricted Log Likelihood 
 
    -1,590.54 
 
Prob >  ChiSqd 
 
            0.00 
 
 
 
Notes:   The marginal effects provide percentage point changes in the probability of an outcome. Marginal effects are 
computed  at  means of explanatory variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a 
significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Merged versus Non-Merged Firms after Matching 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Firm- 
years 
 
R&D Intensity 
 
Patent Intensity 
 
Patent Stock 
 
R&D Productivity 
     
 
mean 
 
t-statistic  mean  t-statistic  mean  t-statistic  mean  t-statistic 
 
1 
 
Merged 
 
64   
 
0.001   
 
1.280   
 
0.002   
  Non-merged  1622 
 
 
0.069 
0.116  0.51  0.012  0.50  0.877  -1.19  0.077  0.67 
2  Merged  60  0.0776    0.015    2.293    0.168   
  Non-merged  1339 
 
0.0862  0.15  0.015  -0.02  2.000  -0.78  0.161  -0.03 
3  Merged  48  0.108    0.002    1.355    0.001   
  Non-merged  1109 
 
0.142  0.62  0.010  0.71  0.921  -1.24  0.162  0.59 
4  Merged  59  0.12    0.006    1.560    0.010   
  Non-merged  765 
 
0.13  0.23  0.013  1.37  1.045  -1.40  0.170  1.26 
5  Merged  60  0.135    0.032    3.528    0.384   
  Non-merged 
 
514  0.114  -1.38  0.014  1.45  2.446  -5.12  0.222  1.16 
 
 
Notes: The number of the observations are smaller than those in the tables 1 and 2 due to the region of common       
support requirement. 
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Table 5. Effects of M&A (Average Treatment Effects on the Treated) 
 
 
 
 
First year 
(t+1 to t+2) 
 
Second year 
(t+2 to t+3) 
 
Third year 
(t+3 to t+4) 
 
R&D Intensity 
 
    0.139
*** 
(0.045) 
 
    0.193
*** 
(0.052) 
 
    0.228
*** 
(0.039) 
 
Patent Intensity 
 
     0.083
*** 
(0.004) 
 
           -0.113 
(0.152) 
 
           -0.051 
(0.436) 
 
Patent Stock (Ln) 
 
       0.0046
*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.004 
(0.024) 
 
0.018 
(0.025) 
 
R&D Productivity 
 
0.816 
(0.626) 
 
           -0.006 
(0.589) 
 
0.238 
(0.315) 
 
Total Assets (Ln) 
 
  0.052
** 
(0.026) 
 
0.041 
(0.026) 
 
0.040 
(0.028) 
 
Annual Growth of Market 
Value (Ln) 
 
     0.338
*** 
(0.103) 
 
           -0.027 
(0.197) 
 
0.124 
(0.146) 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
2.500 
(2.920) 
 
2.076 
(2.053) 
 
1.694 
(1.642) 
 
Cash-Flow Ratio 
 
           -0.031 
(0.874) 
 
1.002 
(3.016) 
 
-1.052 
(2.096) 
 
 
Notes: Reported are means. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
***, 
**  and 
* indicate a significance level     of 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Rosenbaum Bounds for Effects of M&A 
 
Gamma 
 
R&D intensity 
 
Patent Intensity  Patent Stock 
[Q
+-MH; Q
--MH] 
 
p-critical 
 
[Q
+-MH; Q
--MH]  p-critical  [Q
+-MH; Q
--MH]  p-critical   
 
 
1.00 
 
[1.9775; 1.9775] 
 
0.0002 
 
 
[1.6774; 1.6774] 
 
0.0334 
 
[1.1254; 1.1254] 
 
0.0000 
1.20  [1.7896; 2.5660]  0.0113 
 
[1.4226; 2.2627]  0.0843  [1.0452; 1.8044]  0.0003 
1.40  [1.5221; 2.9142]  0.0401 
 
[1.2476; 2.5704]  0.2910  [1.5905; 2.0123]  0.0051 
1.60  [1.3764; 3.2422]  0.1211 
 
[1.1898; 2.8621]  0.3200  [0.0864; 2.3213]  0.0124 
1.80  [1.1644; 3.5521]  0.2523 
 
[1.1342; 3.1394]  0.5171  [0.0657; 2.7868]  0.0594 
2.00  [1.0897; 3.8461]  0.2973 
 
[1.0698; 3.4764]  0.5940  [0.0266; 2.9612]  0.0821 
 
Notes: Q
+-MH and Q
--MH are Mantel-Haenszel test statistics under assumptions of overestimated and 
underestimated treatment effects. Significance levels are under assumption of overestimation of treatment effects.   32
Appendix 
Figure 1. M&A in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry, 
1988-2002
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Figure 2. Average R&D expenditures in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry, 1988-2002
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Figure 3. Patenting in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry, 
1988-2000
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